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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION EXCEPTION OF THE ALASKA TORT
CLAIMS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
It is as much the duty of government to render prompt justice
against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same
between private individuals.1
-Abraham Lincoln
The Alaska Tort Claims Act2 abolished the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and thus made the state liable for its torts. The state's tort
liability, however, is subject to a limited exception for discretionary
functions performed by state entities and employees. 3 In actions
brought under the Alaska Tort Claims Act, the Alaska Supreme
Court has inconsistently applied the discretionary function exception.
The purpose of this note is to examine the Alaska Supreme
Court's construction of the discretionary function exception to state
tort liability. After a brief historical introduction to the concept of
sovereign immunity in the United States at the federal and state levels,
the note discusses three major judicial approaches to defining discre-
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1. First Annual Message to Congress by President Lincoln (Dec. 3, 1861), re-
printed in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS (1789-1897) 51 (published
by Richardson 1897); see also Comment, Sovereign Immunity in Georgia, 27 EMORY
L.J. 717, 741 (1978).
2. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.50.250-.300 (1983) (enacted in 1962).
3. Id. § 09.50.250(1). The Alaska Tort Claims Act provides in pertinent part:
A person or corporation having a ... tort claim against the state may
bring an action against the state .... However, no action may be brought
under this section if the claim
(1) is an action for tort, and based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a state agency or an employee of the state, whether or not the discre-
tion involved is abused.
This note will not consider the other exception included within this subsection of
the Alaska Tort Claims Act which expressly grants immunity to the state for its ac-
tions conducted with due care, without regard to the validity of the statute or regula-
tion. Clearly, governmental entities or employees are not negligent for actions
performed with due care pursuant to a valid statute. Therefore, this grant of immu-
nity is likely to have a greater impact on potential state tort liability for actions taken
pursuant to an invalid statute or regulation. The note examines only the discretionary
function exception which provides immunity for tortious state conduct performed
under a proper grant of authority. See infra text accompanying notes 126-38.
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tionary governmental acts. The note then reviews the Alaska Supreme
Court's decision in Abbott v. State,4 which adopted the planning-
operational approach for defining discretionary governmental func-
tions which are entitled to immunity under the Alaska Tort Claims
Act.5 This approach provides immunity for tortious state acts which
are predicated upon basic policy considerations. The note follows
with an examination of the more recent Alaska decisions and criticizes
the court's inconsistent treatment of the immunity issue. Finally, the
note proposes a return to a pure application of the planning-opera-
tional distinction as articulated in Abbott. This approach serves the
legislative purposes behind the discretionary function exception to tort
liability and provides guidelines for the application of the exception.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
A. The Federal Approach Prior to 1946
Historically, the doctrine of sovereign immunity provided per-
sonal immunity to the monarch for his actions. Later, immunity pro-
tected the nation-state and lesser governmental entities. 6 By the mid-
nineteenth century, the concept of sovereign immunity was accepted
by the federal and state courts in the United States. 7
The United States Supreme Court, however, did not immediately
accept the concept of governmental immunity. In fact, the Court, in
Chisholm v. Georgias rejected the argument that the states enjoyed
immunity from suit by individual citizens of other states.9 Chief Jus-
tice Jay seemed to refute the notion that the concept of governmental
immunity was applicable to a republican form of government, which,
unlike the feudal societies of Europe, is based upon a social contract.
He stated that:
In Europe the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the Prince; here it
rests with the people; there, the sovereign actually administers the
Government; here, never in a single instance; our Governors are the
agents of the people, and at most, stand in the same relation to their
sovereign, in which regents in Europe stand to their sovereigns.
Their Princes have personal powers, dignities, and pre-eminences,
our rulers have none but official; nor do they partake in the sover-
eignty otherwise, or in any other capacity, than as private citizens. 10
4. 498 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1972).
5. Id. at 718. The planning-operational approach is discussed infra in text ac-
companying notes 49-63.
6. See Hink & Schutter, Some Thoughts on the American Law of Governmental
Tort Liability, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 710, 711 (1965-66).
7. See id. at 711-12.
8. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
9. Id. at 479.
10. Id. at 472 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court's view on state sover-
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The Supreme Court first applied the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity to bar a tort action against the federal government in its 1868
decision, The Siren. I The Court justified its application of sovereign
immunity on the basis of:
reasons of public policy; the inconvenience and danger which would
follow from any different rule. It is obvious that the public service
would be hindered, and the public safety endangered, if the supreme
authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen,
and consequently controlled in the use and disposition of the means
required for the proper administration of the government. The ex-
emption from direct suit is, therefore, without exception.
12
Despite the Supreme Court's language in The Siren, the Court
has recognized exceptions to the application of sovereign immunity.
Claims against the United States were permitted when the United
States consented to suit by some act of Congress, 13 when proceedings
were initiated by the United States, l4 or when another party was sub-
stituted as a defendant in the place of the United States.I'
In addition, Congress used its authority to pass private bills to
compensate individuals for injuries suffered as a result of negligent ac-
tivities of federal governmental entities and employees. 16 The private
bill method resulted in a deluge of bills.17 The burdensome and expen-
eignty in Chisolm was rejected by the passage of the eleventh amendment, which pre-
vented the judicial power of the United States from being extended to suits
commenced against a state by citizens of another state or a foreign state. U.S. CONST.
amend. XI; see Note, Separation of Powers and the Discretionary Function Exception:
Political Question in Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 IowA L. REv. 930,
933 n.14 (1971).
11. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868). Attention had been given to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity by Justice John Marshall in United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 436 (1834), where he stated in dictum that the federal government could invoke
the doctrine. Id. at 444. The doctrine was first applied to the federal government in a
contract action in United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846).
12. The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 154.
13. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 444 (Act of Congress settling land claims seen as a
waiver of sovereign immunity).
14. The Siren, 71 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 154 (United States may waive sovereign immu-
nity, but may not be liable for costs or relief beyond the demand or property in
controversy).
15. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 197 (1882) (ejectment action brought
against officers of the United States to recover land confiscated during the Civil War);
see also Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United States 1790-
1955, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 795, 800 (practice involves a legal fiction as to the actual party
being sued and does not truly waive sovereign immunity).
16. See generally Kramer, supra note 15, at 800 n.25.
17. See Mikva, Sovereign Immunity: In a Democracy the Emperor Has No
Clothes, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 828, 831 n.23 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1945)) (over 15,000 private bills were considered by Congress in the six years
prior to the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act).
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sive congressional investigations of the merits of every claim13 under-
scored the need for the Federal Tort Claims Act.
B. The State Approach Prior to 1946
Prior to 1946, the state courts generally granted immunity from
tort liability to state entities and employees.19 The states, however, did
not absolutely adhere to the concept of immunity. For example, a
Kentucky court allowed a state-run restaurant to be sued for breach of
contract. 20 Similarly, many state courts permitted victims of state
torts to recover damages.21 In addition, states provided legislative re-
lief to certain classes of individuals deprived of a damage remedy by
sovereign immunity. Many state legislatures created committees and
administrative bodies to consider the petitions of individuals. Deserv-
ing claims received compensation upon passage of a private bill by the
legislature.22
C. Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity After 1946
By the mid-twentieth century, sovereign immunity was applied
less frequently on both the federal and state levels of government. 23 In
1946, Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act,24 which provided
for a general waiver of federal immunity for all governmental torts
subject to certain defined exceptions.25 Many states subsequently en-
acted statutory waiver provisions.
The state statutes waiving sovereign immunity are generally of
three types: (1) absolute waivers; (2) limited waivers applicable only
18. Mikva, supra note 17, at 831.
19. See, eg., Black v. Rempublicam, 1 Yeates 140 (Pa. 1792) (court held that it
did not have jurisdiction to hear a case based on tortious actions of Revolutionary
War officers without consent of the state); Commonwealth v. Colquhouns, 12 Va. (2
Hen. & M.) 213 (1808) (court held that a suit could not be maintained against the
state for tortious handling of tobacco by state inspectors). For further explanation of
these cases, see Kramer, supra note 15, at 801-03.
20. Gross v. Kentucky Bd. of Managers of World's Columbian Exposition, 105
Ky. 840, 49 S.W. 458 (1899).
21. See Kramer, supra note 15, at 806-09.
22. Id. at 808-09. For a summary of pre-1954 state remedies, see also Leflar &
Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1363 (1954).
23. This note will not discuss sovereign immunity in the municipal context. The
Alaska courts rejected local government immunity in City of Fairbanks v. Schaible,
375 P.2d 201, 208 (Alaska 1962), overruled on other grounds, Scheele v. City of
Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1963) (rejected holding in Schaible which held that
immunity was abrogated only prospectively). In Alaska, local entities are treated as
ordinary tort defendants. See, eg., Morrison v. City of Anchorage, 390 P.2d 782
(Alaska 1964); Hale v. City of Anchorage, 389 P.2d 434 (Alaska 1964).
24. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).
25. See id. § 2680.
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to specific types of claims; and (3) general waivers subject to certain
defined exceptions.26 The first type of statutory scheme absolutely ab-
rogates state immunity. These statutes generally contain an explicit
statement of state liability for the torts of governmental entities and
employees. For example, the state of Washington's statute declares
that the state "shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious
conduct to the same extent as if a private person or corporation. '27
The second type of statutory scheme retains sovereign immunity in
general but provides limited waivers of immunity for certain state
acts. 28 This second type of waiver provision is best typified by the
California Tort Claims Act.29 The state of Alaska utilizes the third
type of statutory scheme, which provides a general waiver of sovereign
immunity, subject to certain specified exceptions.
An exception to government tort liability which has been a major
source of litigation is the discretionary function exception. This ex-
ception is included in both the Federal Tort Claims Act30 and the
Alaska Tort Claims Act.31 The exception first appeared in the Federal
Tort Claims Act and was intended to preserve sovereign immunity for
torts arising from "the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a [gov-
ernmental] agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
26. See Comment, supra note 1, at 750-54.
27. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (emphasis added);
see also Court of Claims Act, N.Y. JUD. LAW § 8 (McKinney 1963).
The Washington statute unquestionably provides for state accountability for its
torts when the state performs activities which also are commonly performed by pri-
vate persons and corporations. The statute, however, has been construed by the
Washington Supreme Court as providing only a qualified removal of immunity. In
Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965),
the majority rejected the notion that the statutory language should be construed ex-
pansively. Id. at 263, 407 P.2d at 449 (Finley, J., dissenting). Instead, for public
policy reasons, the supreme court held that the waiver was limited and inapplicable to
certain legislative, judicial, and executive processes of government not performed by
private persons or corporations. Id. at 252-53, 407 P.2d at 444.
28. See Policy Determination: Formulation of a Legislative Solution, 5 CAL. L.
REviSION COMM'N REP. 267, 268-69 (1963).
29. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1985).
The California Tort Claims Act was enacted in response to the California
Supreme Court's holding in Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d
457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961), which abrogated all precedent in the area of sovereign
immunity. After Muskopf, the California Law Revision Commission conducted a
comprehensive study of the sovereign immunity problem. The findings of the Com-
mission were generally incorporated into the California Tort Claims Act. See Com-
ment, Discretionary Immunity in California in the Aftermath of Johnson v. State, 15
SANTA CLARA LAW. 454, 458 (1974-75); see also Comment, supra note 1, at 753
n.226.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
31. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.50.250(1) (1983).
1985]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
the discretion involved is abused."' 32 The following subsections of the
note examine three approaches for defining discretionary state action.
1. The Semantic Approach. Generally, courts have had difficulty
applying the discretionary function exception.33 Neither the Federal
nor the Alaska Tort Claims Act defines the term "discretionary." As
a result, some courts have tried to develop a dictionary or semantic
definition of the term.34 The dictionary definition of "discretionary
acts" - "[tihose acts wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to
course of conduct that one must or must not take" 35 - often proves to
be too broad for judicial application because almost all governmental
conduct involves some measure of discretionary activity. Thus, the
semantic approach is largely subjective, 36 and claimants are left in
doubt as to which are the determinative criteria in identifying discre-
tionary governmental conduct.
The practical result of the semantic approach is that the discre-
tionary function exception is often too broadly applied.37 The broad
application of the discretionary function exception can be best illus-
trated by use of a hypothetical. 38
Assume that the Alaska government built a lighthouse at Risky
Inlet, Alaska. The first step toward the construction of the lighthouse
was the legislative decision to establish a policy of encouraging inter-
coastal commerce. This policy was effectuated by a decision to estab-
lish a coastal lighthouse network. The state legislative decisions were
made at the highest level of the governmental decisionmaking process.
The implementation of the lighthouse network was delegated to
the Alaska Coastal and Port Authority (CPA). The CPA engineers
selected the number, locations, and designs of the various lighthouses.
The engineers were authorized to consider and did consider factors
such as demographics, geography, and construction costs in reaching
their decisions. Ultimately, the engineers chose to construct a single
lighthouse at the entrance to Risky Inlet instead of two less powerful
ones. These decisions constitute the second or intermediate level of
governmental decisionmaking.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
33. See Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort
ClaimsAct, 57 GEo. L.J. 81, 112 (1968-69).
34. See id. at 108-10.
35. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (5th ed. 1979).
36. See Reynolds, supra note 33, at 110.
37. Id.
38. This hypothetical is also used to illustrate the operation of the two other ap-
proaches to defining discretionary acts, see infra text accompanying notes 46-48 & 61-
63, and to compare the three approaches, see infra notes 64-66 and accompanying
text.
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After construction of the lighthouse at Risky Inlet, a crew chief
was employed to operate and maintain the lighthouse. He established
an inspection schedule for October which included hourly signal light
inspections until midnight, and inspections every three hours from
midnight until dawn. The inspection decision was made at the third
or lowest level of the governmental decisionmaking process. In reach-
ing this decision, the crew chief considered his past experience in mak-
ing inspection duty assignments and his own personal convenience.
An unfortunate chain of events occurred at Risky Inlet on the
thirty-first of October which raises the question of Alaska's immunity.
At 12:30 a.m., unknown vandals entered the Risky Inlet lighthouse
and short-circuited the emergency backup system for the lighthouse.
Shortly thereafter, an electrical storm knocked out all power in the
Risky Inlet area, including the electricity supplied to the lighthouse.
As a result of the vandalism and the electrical storm, the lighthouse
beacon was not lit when a merchant ship entered the inlet. At 2 a.m.
the ship wrecked along the shoreline opposite the Risky Inlet light-
house and adjacent to the exact location that the CPA engineers had
considered for a second lighthouse. As a result, the owner of the
merchant ship initiated an action against the state alleging that the
state was negligent at all levels of its decisionmaking process. The
legislature's policy decision to protect commercial shipping solely by
establishing a lighthouse network, the CPA engineers' decision to
erect only one lighthouse at the entrance to Risky Inlet, and the Risky
Inlet lighthouse crew chief's decision to rely upon a relaxed inspection
schedule on the thirty-first of October were all alleged to have been
negligent.
Under the semantic approach to defining discretionary govern-
mental acts, the state in the above hypothetical could successfully de-
fend each of the merchant shipowner's claims on the grounds that
each of the challenged decisions involved some form of authorized
governmental judgment. Hence, the semantic approach to defining
discretionary conduct is too broad because almost all conceivable gov-
ernmental actions appear to be discretionary under this definition.3 9
39. Reynolds criticizes the semantic approach for defining discretionary conduct.
Reynolds noted that the approach:
might be justified as carrying out the [Federal Tort Claims] Act's literal in-
tent, although it runs counter to congressional and judicial statements in
favor of liberal relief. But it presents an added problem to courts and pro-
spective plaintiffs by failing to provide a definition of discretion. . . . Where
there is no further explanation, one can only conclude that "discretion"
means any exercise of judgment or choice.
Reynolds, supra note 33, at 110.
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2. The Good Samaritan Test. The good Samaritan test for defining
the discretionary ftmction exception originated in the federal courts. 4°
The courts which follow this approach rely on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Indian Towing Co. v. United States,41
which imposed a duty of due care upon governmental entities and em-
ployees when, after discretion has been exercised, they undertake ac-
tivities implementing the discretionary decision.42 The Court in
Indian Towing Co. held that the federal government was not immune
from tort liability when it failed to properly maintain a lighthouse and
to give warning of its inoperative state, even though the Coast Guard
was not obligated to provide any lighthouse service for shipping. Once
the Coast Guard exercised its discretion and chose to provide such
service, the Court held that the Coast Guard had the nondiscretionary
duty to act with due care.4 3 Theoretically, the good Samaritan test
embodies a liberal construction of the government's waiver of immu-
nity in tort liability cases. 44 In practical terms, this view of sovereign
immunity allows immunity solely for the initial act of governmental
discretion, "such as a decision to undertake a project," but does not
extend the immunity to lower levels of decisionmaking, such as "the
establishment of plans and specifications by administrators on an in-
termediate level of government. '45
The definition of discretionary governmental functions which
arises from the court's reliance on the good Samaritan test results in a
narrower application of the discretionary function exception than does
the semantic approach.46 This point is illustrated by applying the
good Samaritan test to the Risky Inlet hypothetical. The decision of
the legislature to encourage and protect intercoastal commercial ship-
ping solely by the construction of a lighthouse network may be charac-
terized as an initial act of governmental discretion, even if one of
questionable prudence. Thus, the legislature's decision would be im-
mune from tort liability. On the other hand, the intermediate level
decision of the CPA engineers to erect only one lighthouse at the en-
trance to Risky Inlet, and the lower level decision of the crew chief to
40. Id. at 89-90. The first clear formulation of the good Samaritan test by a fed-
eral court was in Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1950). For a
discussion of the early development of the good Samaritan test, see Reynolds, supra
note 33, at 89-90.
41. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
42. Id. at 69.
43. Id.
44. See Reynolds, supra note 33, at 100. "Perhaps the greatest significance of
Indian Towing was the Supreme Court's liberal application of the [Federal Tort
Claims] Act as a whole." Id.
45. Comment, Scope of the Discretionary Function Exception under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 67 GEo. L.J. 879, 891 (1979).
46. See Reynolds, supra note 33, at 110.
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monitor the lighthouse less frequently after midnight, would not be
included within the definition of discretionary conduct under the good
Samaritan test.47 Indeed, all subsequent governmental activities
implementing the lighthouse service would be considered outside the
definition of discretionary conduct.48 Therefore, the conduct of both
the CPA engineers and the Risky Inlet crew chief would be subject to
the due care challenges of the injured shipowner.
3. The Planning-Operational Distinction. Neither the narrow good
Samaritan test nor the broad semantic approach to defining discretion-
ary conduct provides an effective test to determine whether intermedi-
ate and lower level governmental activities are discretionary. 49 The
planning-operational distinction, however, does provide an effective
test.
Initially developed by the federal courts,50 the planning-opera-
tional distinction goes a step beyond the good Samaritan test. Under
the planning-operational test, the state's initial policy decision and all
other authorized governmental activities that are based upon evalua-
tions of basic policy factors, are considered discretionary, regardless of
the level of the governmental decisionmaker.5' All of these decisions
are considered planning level decisions. Therefore, the planning-oper-
ational distinction excludes from its definition of discretionary con-
duct day-to-day activities of governmental entities and employees5 2
which are considered operational level decisions. In Swanson v.
United States53 a federal district court provided a clear articulation of
the planning-operational distinction:
47. See, e.g., Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. United States, 473 F.2d 714, 716-17
(5th Cir. 1973) (held that the initial decision to build a drainage ditch was discretion-
ary, but the government was obligated to perform the design and construction of the
ditch with due care).
48. See supra text accompanying note 45.
49. See Reynolds, supra note 33, at 127-28.
50. See id. at 103-07. The lower federal courts rest their support for the planning-
operational distinction on dictum in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In
Dalehite, the Supreme Court found that the federal government was immune from tort
liability under the discretionary function exception for injuries caused by an explosion.
In a concluding statement, the Court mentioned that the government actions consid-
ered culpable "were all responsibly made at the planning rather than operational
level." Id. at 42. The Court, however, did not intend this statement to establish a
definition of discretionary conduct under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Peck, The
Federal Tort Claims Act, A Proposed Construction of the Discretionary Function Excep-
tion, 31 WASH. L. REv. 207, 219 n.37 (1956).
51. See Reynolds, supra note 33, at 127-28, 130-31.
52. Id. at 129.
53. 229 F. Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Cal. 1964) (discretionary function exception did
not apply in a wrongful death action alleging governmental negligence in the design or
installation of a modification of an aircraft).
1985]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
In a strict sense, every action of a government employee, ex-
cept perhaps a conditioned reflex action, involves the use of some
degree of discretion. The planning level notion refers to decisions
involving questions of policy, that is, the evaluation of factors such
as the financial, political, economic, and social effects of a given
plan or policy ...
The operation[al] level decision, on the other hand, involves
decisions relating to the normal day-by-day operations of govern-
ment. Decisions made at this level may involve the exercise of dis-
cretion but not the evaluation of policy factors.54
Thus, courts which apply the planning-operational distinction do
not label governmental conduct as discretionary simply by applying a
semantic definition of the term. The courts also do not rely upon the
often underinclusive approach of the good Samaritan test in iden-
tifying discretionary government functions. Rather, the planning-
operational distinction requires a judicial inquiry into whether the
challenged conduct was in fact dependent upon an evaluation of basic
policy factors. 55
The advantage of the planning-operational distinction is that it is
closely aligned with the legislative purpose underlying the discretion-
ary function exception to governmental tort liability. The purpose of
the discretionary function exception is the preservation of the separa-
tion of powers between coordinate branches of government.56 With-
out the discretionary function exception, the courts would be obligated
to reexamine every allegedly tortious governmental act and serve as
the ultimate tribunal for the resolution of every political, social, and
economic policy choice of the government.57 Therefore, to effectuate
the legislative purpose, the distinction designates as discretionary
those activities or decisions that have been committed to either the
legislative or executive branch of government and that result from the
exercise of either branch's authority.58 Additionally, courts applying
the planning-operational distinction recognize that they are ill-
equipped to evaluate basic policy questions.5 9 Thus, once the govern-
mental entity or employee exercises its authority, and in fact chooses a
course of conduct based upon a consideration of basic policy factors,
54. Id. at 219-20.
55. See Harris & Schnepper, Federal Tort Claims Act: Discretionary Function Ex-
ception Revisited, 31 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 161, 189 (1976-77); Reynolds, supra note 33,
at 130-31.
56. See Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception to Government Tort Lia-
bility, 61 MARQUETTE L. REv. 163, 166 (1977-78); see also Reynolds, supra note 33,
at 83-84.
57. See Note, The Discretionary-Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 42 ALa. L. Rav. 721, 727 (1977-78).
58. See Reynolds, supra note 33, at 121-22.
59. See Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 794, 447 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr.
240, 248 (1968); see also Reynolds, supra note 33, at 121-22.
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courts using the planning-operational distinction will characterize this
choice as a planning level decision and refuse to examine its merits.
Applied in this manner, the discretionary function exception merely
provides the judiciary with a legislative basis for refusing to reexamine
governmental conduct which is of a discretionary or planning
nature.6
0
The ability of the planning-operational distinction to provide an
analytical framework for defining discretionary conduct so that it in-
cludes both initial and intermediate levels of governmental policy-
making can be demonstrated by the Risky Inlet hypothetical. Clearly,
the legislature's decision to promote and protect intercoastal commer-
cial shipping solely by the establishment of a lighthouse network is an
initial policy choice and therefore discretionary, even if in retrospect it
evinces unsound judgment. The decision involved an assessment of
economic and political policy factors which the courts will not second-
guess under the separation of powers doctrine. 61 The CPA engineers'
decision to erect a single lighthouse at the entrance to Risky Inlet also
was dependent upon an evaluation of various financial, political, and
economic factors (demographic and geographic need, construction
and maintenance costs, and the effectiveness of alternatives). There-
fore, the engineers' decision also may be characterized as a planning
level decision.6 2 The crew chief's decision to conduct less frequent
checks on the facility after midnight, however, did not involve a con-
sideration of basic policy factors because it was based upon the crew
chief's convenience and past experience with maintenance problems.
In fact, the choice of an inspection schedule is a normal day-to-day
operation of government, that is, the type of decision which may be
adjusted routinely without the evaluation of policy factors. Thus, the
lower level decision of the crew chief would be classified as operational
and non-discretionary, thereby subjecting the state to potential tort
liability.6 3
4. A Comparison of the Three Approaches. As the Risky Inlet hy-
pothetical demonstrates, whether the court chooses the semantic, good
Samaritan, or planning-operational approach will make a crucial dif-
ference in its determination whether governmental conduct is discre-
tionary.64 Under all three approaches, the initial decision to
implement a policy, such as the legislature's decision to establish a
lighthouse network in the Risky Inlet hypothetical, will be regarded as
60. See Reynolds, supra note 33, at 123, 130-31; see also Johnson, 69 Cal. 2d at
794, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
62. See supra text accompanying note 51.
63. See supra text accompanying note 52.
64. See Reynolds, supra note 33, at 113.
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discretionary.6 5 Beyond this initial policy choice, the three ap-
proaches reach different conclusions as to what constitutes discretion-
ary conductA6 With regard to the intermediate levels of governmental
decisions, a court following the good Samaritan approach often will
classify such decisions, like those of the CPA engineers, as nondiscre-
tionary. The classification of an activity as discretionary by a court
applying the planning-operational distinction will depend upon the
particular factual situation and upon whether broad policy factors
were considered. A court relying on the semantic approach will be
more likely to label the decision as discretionary, but the outcome will
depend upon the court's definition of the term "discretionary."
Lastly, the level of governmental decisions involving non-policy fac-
tors, like those of day-to-day lighthouse operations in the hypothetical,
may be deemed discretionary under the semantic approach but not
under the good Samaritan or planning-operational approaches.
III. EVOLUTION OF THE ALASKA APPROACH TO THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
A. State v. Abbott - Enunciation of the Planning-Operational
Distinction
As the previous section illustrates, a general statutory waiver of
immunity that is subject to a discretionary function exception, like the
Alaska Tort Claims Act, permits the judiciary to exercise substantial
freedom in construing the scope of the waiver of immunity. 67 The
actual scope of the waiver of immunity depends upon the court's
choice of an analytical approach to defining the discretionary function
exceptionA8 The Alaska Supreme Court faced this choice for the first
time in State v. Abbott69 and adopted the planning-operational
distinction.70
The plaintiff, Brenda Vogt, brought an action for damages against
the state of Alaska under the Alaska Tort Claims Act for injuries she
suffered in an automobile accident. 71 She alleged that the state was
"negligent in its design, construction and maintenance of the road and
in failing to post signs warning of the hazardous condition of the
65. See id. at 124.
66. The hypothetical presented is intentionally simple to illustrate and compare
the extreme outcomes under the three approaches. Outcomes will deviate depending
on a particular court's articulation and application of its chosen approach.
67. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1983); see supra note 3.
68. See supra text accompanying note 64.
69. 498 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1972).
70. Id. at 721.
71. Abbott, 498 P.2d at 715.
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curve."172 The superior court found that the alleged tortious activities
of the state "were not within the discretionary function exception to
the waiver of sovereign immunity." 73 The court also held that the
state of Alaska was negligent in its winter maintenance of the curve
and therefore was liable for the plaintiff's injuries.74
On appeal, the state renewed its sovereign immunity claim for the
winter road maintenance program.75 The Alaska Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court's decision, but remanded the case for further
findings of fact as to the damage award.76
Justice Erwin, writing for the court, acknowledged that the court
had never interpreted the discretionary function exception. 77 In se-
lecting the planning-operational distinction for determining whether a
discretionary governmental function was being challenged, the Abbott
court focused on the purposes underlying the exception.78 The court
outlined the purposes behind the discretionary function exception to
state liability as:
(1) the need to preserve separation of powers by limiting judicial
reexamination of decisions made by the other branches of govern-
ment; (2) the fact that courts are not equipped to investigate and
balance all the factors that go into an executive or legislative deci-
sion; (3) the public interest in preventing the enormous and unpre-
dictable liability that would result from judicial reexamination of
the decisions of the other branches of government. 79
The Abbott court perceived that the planning-operational distinction,
although not a bright-line test, provided the best method for satisfying
the legislature's intent in enacting the discretionary function
exception. 80
The court also chose the planning-operational distinction because
it defines as planning decisions those decisions which either formulate
72. Id.
73. Id. at 716.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 716-17.
76. Id. at 717.
77. Id. The Abbott court held that because the critical statutory language in the
Alaska Tort Claims Act was identical to the wording of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
relevant federal case law could be considered in interpreting the discretionary function
exception. Id. at 717 & n.2 (citing Cesar v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd.,
383 P.2d 805, 807 (Alaska 1963)).
78. Abbott, 498 P.2d at 721-22. The court in Abbott expressed its support for the
planning-operational distinction without any reservations, even though its application
would entail delicate inquiry into each case. The court stated that "[s]ince this ap-
proach has the analytic virtue of focusing on the reasons for granting immunity to the
governmental entity, however, we are persuaded that it is a well-reasoned approach to
the problem." Id. at 721.
79. Id. at 721-22 (citing Reynolds, supra note 33, at 121-23, 128-31).
80. See 498 P.2d at 721.
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basic policies and designs or fix long term goals which are deemed
politically desirable. 81 Nondiscretionary decisions are operational de-
cisions, which involve routine activities or the implementation of a
policy decision. 82
The court in Abbott also focused on the practical aspects of em-
ploying the planning-operational distinction. The court realized that
it must accommodate the purposes which underlie the discretionary
function exception in applying the distinction.8 3 An analysis for ap-
plying the planning-operational distinction which serves the three ba-
sic purposes of the discretionary function exception is set forth below.
The analysis focuses on the nature of the governmental activity or de-
cision being challenged. The first step of the analysis determines
whether the governmental decisionmakers were authorized to consider
basic policy factors. In resolving this question, the court must deter-
mine whether the factors the decisionmaker was authorized to con-
sider were in fact basic policy factors - that is, whether the factors
involve political, economic or social concerns. A reexamination of
these factors by the court would conflict with the purposes underlying
the discretionary function exception (the preservation of the separa-
tion of powers, the judiciary's inability to investigate and balance such
factors, and the prevention of enormous and unpredictable liability).
The second step of the analysis determines whether these factors were
in fact considered. If the decisionmaker was authorized to consider
basic policy factors and did consider them, then the state is immune
from tort liability. This analysis must be followed for a proper appli-
cation of the planning-operational distinction. 84
The Abbott court thoughtfully considered and conclusively re-
jected two alternative approaches - the good Samaritan test 85 and the
semantic approach.86 The court recognized that the good Samaritan
test has some merit,87 but thought that the planning-operational dis-
tinction was superior, because it requires the courts to use an analysis
which is sensitive to the preservation of the separation of powers doc-
trine.88 Furthermore, the planning-operational approach does not re-
81. See id. at 721-22.
82. Id. at 721 (citing Rogers v. State, 51 Hawaii 293, 459 P.2d 378 (1969)).
83. 498 P.2d at 721-22 (quoting Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 794, 447 P.2d
352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 248 (1968), and citing Reynolds, supra note 33, at 121-23,
128-31)).
84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
87. Abbott, 498 P.2d at 719-20. TheAbbott court viewed the planning-operational
distinction and the good Samaritan test as closely related, and stated that the two
approaches would "lead to the same result in most cases." Id. at 720.
88. Id. at 721 (citing Reynolds, supra note 33, at 121-23, 128-31).
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quire courts to conduct investigations and balance policies, processes
which courts are ill-equipped to perform.8 9 The semantic approach
was rejected by the Abbott court because it lacks any analytical virtue.
Under the semantic approach, a court may characterize a governmen-
tal act as discretionary without any explanation of how the court
reached its conclusion.90 In addition, the semantic approach is overly
broad. The Abbott court recognized that almost any governmental
act, even the positioning of a nail, involves some discretion. 91
Despite the court's choice of the planning-operational distinction
in Abbott, in subsequent cases the Alaska Supreme Court has not fol-
lowed a consistent approach for determining whether specific actions
are discretionary functions. The next sections examine these
decisions.
B. Alaska's Semantic Application of the Planning-Operational
Distinction.
The Alaska Supreme Court has confirmed its rejection of a
strictly literal or semantic interpretation of the discretionary function
exception to governmental tort liability in cases decided since Abbott. 92
The court has stressed repeatedly that the focus of the inquiry in sov-
ereign immunity cases must be on the policies which underlie the dis-
cretionary function doctrine.93 As the court stated in Adams v.
State."94 "We have declined to use a mechanical or semantic test in
determining whether a particular function or duty is discretionary; in-
stead, we must weigh the policy considerations behind the labeling." 95
In fact, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the planning-operational
test precisely because it directs the court's attention to the policies
which underlie the discretionary function exception. 96
Notwithstanding the court's professed rejection of a semantic ap-
proach and its adoption of the planning-operational distinction, the
Alaska Supreme Court has frequently given a strictly literal interpre-
tation to the words "planning" and "operational. '97 The court has
89. See id.
90. See id. at 720 (citing Johnson, 69 Cal.2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240).
91. See id. at 720.
92. See, eg., Carlson v. State, 598 P.2d 969, 972 (Alaska 1979); Adams v. State,
555 P.2d 235, 243 (Alaska 1976); State v. I'Anson, 529 P.2d 188, 193 (Alaska 1974).
93. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 92.
94. 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976).
95. Id. at 243.
96. State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d at 721.
97. See, e.g., Japan Air Lines v. State, 628 P.2d 934, 938 (Alaska 1981) (court
labeled decisions concerning design of a taxiway "operational" decisions, without ana-
lyzing factors which state engineers were authorized to consider, and did consider, in
making these decisions); Jennings v. State, 566 P.2d 1304, 1311-12 (Alaska 1977) (de-
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labeled governmental actions as "planning" or "operational" by sim-
ply concluding that the actions did or did not involve basic policy de-
terminations, without first deciding whether these actions involved
determinations entrusted to a coordinate branch of government. The
labels "planning" and "operational" provide no more guidance for de-
termining whether an action is entitled to immunity than does the la-
bel "discretionary." 9 8 The court has simply substituted one
anomalous label for another. In order for the planning-operational
distinction to serve its purpose, the court must first determine whether
the governmental decisionmakers were authorized to consider basic
policy factors, and then whether these factors were actually consid-
ered. By determining whether the governmental decisionmaker was
authorized to consider, and actually did consider, basic policy factors,
the court ensures that it does not infringe upon the decisionmaking
process entrusted to a coordinate branch of government and does not
consider issues which it is ill-equipped to resolve.
The court used a semantic interpretation of the planning-opera-
tional distinction in Japan Air Lines v. State.99 In Japan Air Lines, the
plaintiff alleged that the state was negligent in its design of an airport
taxiway, and that as a result, a Japan Air Lines (JAL) Boeing 747 slid
off the taxiway while preparing for takeoff. 00 The court granted par-
tial summary judgment to the state with respect to JAL's allegations
of negligence in the state's design of a taxiway, which was twenty-five
feet narrower than required by federal aviation standards 01 and which
failed to adhere to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
standards for taxiways.10 2
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the planning-op-
erational distinction should be used to determine whether decisions
regarding the design of the taxiway were within the discretionary func-
tion exception to governmental tort liability.10 3 The court concluded
that the state engineers's design decisions were operational decisions
which merely implemented the basic policy decision to build a taxiway
suitable for use by wide-body jets. a°4 Therefore, JAL's claim against
cisions not to provide an overpass, warning signs, or a lower speed limit were charac-
terized as planning level decisions without a discussion of how this conclusion was
reached); State v. I'Anson, 529 P.2d 188, 193-94 (Alaska 1974) (court conclusively
stated that failure to mark and stripe a portion of highway was an "operational" deci-
sions, which did not involve the consideration of basic policy factors).
98. For a discussion of the difficulties which result from a semantic definition of
"discretionary," see supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
99. 628 P.2d 934 (Alaska 1981).
100. Id. at 935.
101. Id. at 936.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 938.
104. Id.
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the state was governed by ordinary negligence principles. 10 5
When determining whether the engineering decisions in question
were decisions for which the state could be held liable, the court
should have analyzed the factors which the state engineers were au-
thorized to consider, and which they did in fact consider, in making
these decisions. Instead, the court merely gave a semantic interpreta-
tion to the term "operational" by labeling the engineering decisions
"operational" acts without explaining how it reached this conclu-
sion.10 6 The purpose of the planning-operational distinction is to de-
fine the discretionary function exception by focusing the inquiry on the
policies which underlie the exception.' 0 7 This purpose is not fulfilled
by a semantic application of the planning-operational distinction. A
semantic approach does not include a determination whether the fac-
tors considered were of the broad policy type committed to another
branch of government. The fact that the decisions in question were
made by state engineers and not by a higher level decisionmaking body
should not have been conclusive. The nature of the decision, not the
status of the decisionmaker, should determine whether the discretion-
ary function exception to tort liability applies. 0 8
The state argued in its brief that the design decisions in question
were planning level decisions because they "included considerations of
economy of cost and maintenance, inherent limits imposed by the air-
port's topography, anticipated use, meteorological conditions, dura-
bility, safety, and impact on the overall airport environment and
design."' 0 9 The plaintiff argued that the state engineers were not au-
thorized to balance these factors in reaching their decisions about the
length and width of the taxiway and shoulder areas, because there
were specific engineering criteria and extensive federal and interna-
tional standards which had to be incorporated into the taxiway
plans. 1 0 Thus, the plaintiff argued that the basic policy decisions had
already been made with respect to the engineering decisions in
question.
In order to have correctly reached its conclusion that the design
decisions in question were operational under the planning-operational
distinction, the Japan Air Lines court would have had to conclude
either that the factors set forth by the state were not the broad type of
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See Carlson, 598 P.2d at 972; I'Anson, 529 P.2d at 193; Abbott, 498 P.2d at
721.
108. Carlson, 598 P.2d at 972; Reynolds, supra note 33, at 130-31.
109. Respondent's Brief to Plaintiff's Petition for Review at 9, Japan Air Lines v.
State, 628 P.2d 934 (Alaska 1981) [hereinafter cited as Respondent's Brief].
110. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition for Review at 7-8, Japan
Air Lines v. State, 628 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1981).
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policy factors which were committed to another branch of government
or that the state engineers were not authorized to balance such factors
in reaching the decisions in question because of existing engineering,
federal, and international standards. The court, however, merely de-
clared that the design decisions in question were operational, stating
"the ultimate conclusion rather than the underlying analysis [which is]
required."11 As a result, the court's resolution of the governmental
immunity issue in this case provided no more guidance for applying
the discretionary function exception than a semantic interpretation of
"discretionary" would provide.
The labeling of a decision as "planning" or "operational" without
a meaningful discussion of how this conclusion was reached is present
in many of the cases decided by the Alaska Supreme Court.11 2 This
type of conclusive labeling, however, was avoided in a recent state im-
munity case decided by the Alaska Supreme Court, Wainscott v.
State. 13 In this case, the court engaged in the type of analysis which
is required if the planning-operational distinction is to serve its
purpose. 14
The plaintiff in Wainscott brought a wrongful death action in
which he alleged that his son died as a result of the state's negligent
failure to equip an intersection with a sequential red, amber, and green
traffic signal. 115 The Alaska Supreme Court held that the decision to
install a flashing red and yellow light in lieu of a sequential traffic sig-
nal was a planning level decision. 116 This conclusion was reached af-
ter the court outlined the decisionmaking process of the Alaska
Department of Transportation (DOT). The court explained that the
DOT was given the authority to decide where to install sequential traf-
fic signals, and pursuant to this end, the DOT prepared a priority list
of safety projects." 7 In deciding not to place the Wainscott accident
site on the priority list, the DOT considered the disruption of traffic
flow, potential traffic hazards that a sequential traffic signal might cre-
ate, plans to build an overpass which would render the sequential traf-
fic signal obsolete, and the existence of more pressing safety problems
in other locations."" On the basis of these facts, the Wainscott court
determined that the decision not to install a sequential traffic signal at
the accident site was a basic policy determination which had been
committed to a coordinate branch of government and which the courts
111. Respondent's Brief, supra note 109, at 7.
112. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
113. 642 P.2d 1355 (Alaska 1982).
114. See id. at 1357.
115. Id. at 1355.
116. Id. at 1357.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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were ill-equipped to investigate and balance. 119 Thus, the analysis
used by the court in Wainscott avoided a mere semantic application of
the planning-operational distinction. The "planning" label was ap-
plied to the allegedly negligent decision only after the court analyzed
the factors the DOT was authorized to consider, and did consider, in
making the decision concerning the placement of sequential traffic sig-
nals. In Wainscott, therefore, the planning-operational distinction
served its function of directing the court's inquiry to the policies that
underlie the discretionary function doctrine.
C. The Alaska Supreme Court's Rejection of a Considered Policy
Evaluation Requirement
In the most recent case involving state tort liability, the Alaska
Supreme Court failed to apply the method of analysis which was used
in Wainscott. In fact, this case, Industrial Indemnity Co. v. State, 1
20
expressly rejecied the part of the Wainscott approach which seems to
require the showing of a considered policy evaluation in order for the
state to be entitled to immunity.' 2 '
In Industrial Indemnity Co., the court stated that it was pre-
cluded by the language of the Alaska Tort Claims Act from adopting a
rule which would require the state to prove that a considered policy
evaluation took place as a precondition for immunity from tort liabil-
ity.122 The court explained that the only reason it discussed "the vari-
ous elements of policy weighed" by the DOT in Wainscott was to
"illustrate the kinds of competing factors which lie behind determina-
tions of policy."'1 23 Given the underlying rationale of the Alaska Tort
Claims Act, however, a careful reading of the Act's language suggests
that the court's interpretation of the Act in Industrial Indemnity Co. is
incorrect.
When interpreting the language of the Alaska Tort Claims Act, a
court should construe the discretionary function exception to tort lia-
bility narrowly, because in Alaska "liability is the rule [and] immunity
the exception."' 124 The immunity exception provides that a tort action
may not be brought against the state if it is "based upon the [state's]
exercise or performance or failure to exercise or perform a discretion-
ary function or duty."' 125
119. Id.
120. 669 P.2d 561 (Alaska 1983).
121. Id. at 566 n.ll.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Japan Air Lines v. State, 628 P.2d 934, 937 (Alaska 1981) (quoting Adams v.
State, 555 P.2d 235, 244 (Alaska 1976)).
125. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.50.250(1) (1983) (emphasis added).
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A leading commentator suggests that the use of the wording
"based upon" manifests an intention to create a much more limited
exception than the words "arising out of" would have created. 126
If the acts or omissions on which the plaintiff bases his complaint
were not acts specifically... encountered ... in the discretionary
determination to perform or not to perform the function or duty,
the complaint is not "based upon" the performance or failure to
perform such functions and duties. [The complaint] is instead,
based upon acts or omissions which had nothing to do with the [dis-
cretionary] functions or duties. 127
Thus, the choice of language in the Alaska Tort Claims Act indi-
cates that the legal authority to decide whether or not to perform an
action is not the only element which must be satisfied in order for the
government to enjoy discretionary function immunity. State entities
or employees also must have considered the factors they were author-
ized to consider if the state is to be immune from tort liability. Under
the Alaska Supreme Court's interpretation of the discretionary func-
tion exception in Industrial Indemnity Co., however, the state only has
to show that the state entity or employee had the authority to act or
not act. 128 Therefore, if the state entity was authorized to consider
factors which the court determines to be of a basic policy type, then,
even if these factors were not actually considered, the state is still im-
mune from tort liability. Such an outcome is contrary to the statutory
language of the Alaska Tort Claims Act, because in such cases the
challenged acts or omissions were not "based upon" a "discretionary
determination to perform or not perform the function or duty."' 129 In-
stead, the challenged acts or omissions were based upon non-discre-
tionary - that is, non-basic policy - considerations.
The Alaska Supreme Court's rejection of a rule which would re-
quire the state to prove that a considered policy evaluation took place
as a precondition for immunity is also in contravention of the legisla-
tive purposes behind the discretionary function exception. As dis-
cussed earlier, the principal purpose underlying the discretionary
function exception to tort liability is the preservation of the separation
of powers system. 130 Alaska courts must abstain from reexamining
decisions "properly entrusted to other branches of government," and
thereby avoid deciding issues of policy which exceed the judiciary's
competence.' 3 ' The Alaska Supreme Court adopted the planning-
126. Peck, supra note 50, at 228.
127. Id.
128. See Industrial Indemnity Co., 669 P.2d at 567 & n. 11.
129. Peck, supra note 50, at 228.
130. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
131. Industrial Indemnity Co., 669 P.2d at 563.
[Vol. 2:99
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
operational distinction because it promotes these purposes. 132 Thus,
in cases in which basic policy factors were not considered by a state
entity or employee, the judiciary would not be serving the purposes
behind the discretionary exception by granting immunity to the state.
As the California court in Johnson v. State explained:
The discretionary immunity doctrine is designed for the benefit of
officials who exercise judgment. If this conscious weighing of alter-
natives by the state employee or entity making the decision to act or
not to act in a particular case does not take place, then there is no
reason for state immunity.1.33
In such cases, the courts could analyze the decision according to
ordinary standards of negligence without interfering with the political
or policy judgment of another branch of government.
Contrary to the Alaska Supreme Court's holding in Industrial In-
demnity Co., then, a rule requiring the state to show that a considered
policy evaluation actually took place before the state would be entitled
to immunity is in accord with both the statutory language of the
Alaska Tort Claims Act and its underlying purposes. Such a rule
would place the burden of proof in governmental immunity cases on
the state, the party which is in the best position to convince the court
that a considered policy decision took place. Only the state can fully
detail the decisionmaking process that actually took place in resolving
policy decisions.' 34 In some instances, of course, the mere description
of the state action will suggest that governmental discretion was exer-
cised.' 35 For example, if the challenged action involved the initiation
of a new state program, the court should assume that governmental
discretion was exercised.' 36 In most situations, however, the state
would have to show how a particular decision was reached; "whether
as a matter of fact substantiated by the evidence, discretion was exer-
cised" by persons with the proper authority to make the decision. 37
For example, in the case of an engineering decision concerning the
placement of a sign or the design of a road, sovereign immunity might
be appropriate, but the state should have to prove that the engineer
actually made a basic policy decision with respect to these matters. 38
132. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
133. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 794-95 n.8, 447 P.2d 361, 367 n.8, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 240, 249 n.8 (1968).
134. Comment, supra note 29, at 473.
135. Stevenson v. State Dep't of Transportation, 619 P.2d 247, 254, 290 Or. 3, 14
(1980).
136. Id.
137. Peck, supra note 50, at 226.
138. See Stevenson, 619 P.2d at 254.
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D. The Alaska Supreme Court Applies the Good Samaritan Test
Despite Its Rejection of this Test in Abbott
As discussed above, the Alaska Supreme Court has not applied
the planning-operational distinction consistently in a manner that fo-
cuses the sovereign immunity inquiry on the purposes underlying the
discretionary function exception. In addition, in several cases, the
court seemed to abandon the planning-operational test altogether in
favor of the good Samaritan test.139 The court's use of the good Sa-
maritan test is in direct conflict with the Abbott opinion, which explic-
itly rejected the good Samaritan approach. The Abbott court adopted
the planning-operational distinction rather than the good Samaritan
test, because the former test has the analytic virtue of focusing the
court's inquiry on the reasons behind the legislative grant of sovereign
immunity.14° An example of the Alaska Supreme Court's use of the
good Samaritan test is found in Jennings v. State. 141
In Jennings, the.plaintiff alleged that the state was negligent in
failing to provide an overpass for the protection of school children
who crossed a highway in order to attend a Fairbanks school.142 The
plaintiff also asserted that the state was negligent in failing to provide
warning signs, a lower speed limit, and additional controlled crossings
on the same road. 143
The Alaska Supreme Court purported to apply the planning-op-
erational distinction and concluded that the trial court correctly char-
acterized the challenged decisions as planning level decisions which
come within the discretionary function exception. 144 In actuality,
however, the court seems to have used the good Samaritan test to re-
solve the immunity question. The court's conclusion that these were
"planning level" decisions was based on its perceived contrast between
the decisions being challenged and hypothesized implementation deci-
sions. As the court stated: "[H]ad the planning level decision been
made to delineate this area a school zone and then the state negligently
139. See, ag., Johnson v. State, 636 P.2d 47, 65 (Alaska 1981) (The court seemed
to use the good Samaritan test in resolving the immunity issue, which is revealed in its
conclusion that "once the state made the decision to construct the road and crossing,
the discretionary function immunity did not protect it from possible negligence liabil-
ity in the operational carrying out of the basic policy-planning decision to build.");
Japan Air Lines v. State, 628 P.2d 934, 938 (Alaska 1981) (court's conclusion that the
design decisions for the taxiway merely implemented the basic policy decision to build
a taxiway suitable for use by any wide body jets appears to be an application of the
good Samaritan test); Jennings v. State, 566 P.2d 1304, 1312 (Alaska 1977) (court's
use of the good Samaritan test is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 141-45).
140. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
141. 566 P.2d 1304 (Alaska 1977).
142. Id. at 1305.
143. Id. at 1310.
144. Id. at 1311-12.
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signed the area or negligently constructed a crosswalk, a cause of ac-
tion might have arisen against the state for these negligently per-
formed operational acts." 145
As discussed earlier in this note, 146 the good Samaritan approach,
like the court's statement in Jennings, proceeds from the assumption
that only the initial policy determination - in Jennings, the designa-
tion of an area as a school zone - is immune from tort liability under
the discretionary function exception, and that all other state actions
which implement this initial determination are subject to tort liabil-
ity.147 The use of the good Samaritan test to resolve state immunity
cases has several drawbacks, however.
One difficulty with the good Samaritan test is that it provides no
standards for determining where the initial act of discretion ends and
where the duty of care in performing the act begins. 148 For example,
the court in Jennings could have concluded that the initial act of
discretion began and ended with the legislative determination to have
certain areas declared school zones. A court applying the good Sa-
maritan test, therefore, would have to conclude that state or local au-
thorities were liable if they negligently exercised their authority to
designate school zones, even if they considered basic policy factors in
reaching their decision.
Additionally, as demonstrated in the Risky Inlet lighthouse hypo-
thetical, there is a danger that the good Samaritan test will "afford
immunity only for an initial act of discretion such as a decision to
undertake a project and would not extend. . . to include the estab-
lishment of plans and specifications by administrators on an intermedi-
ate level of government."' 49 In Abbott, the Alaska Supreme Court
explained that the discretionary function exception to state tort liabil-
ity was intended to extend immunity to basic policy decisions reached
at any governmental level in order to preserve the separation of gov-
ernmental powers and to prevent the courts from making decisions
which they are il-equipped to resolve. 50 Unlike the planning-opera-
tional distinction, the good Samaritan test fails to focus the inquiry in
immunity cases on the purposes which underlie the discretionary func-
tion doctrine.
Given the analytical shortcomings of the good Samaritan test, the
Alaska Supreme Court should be careful not to rely on the test in
resolving state immunity cases as the court did in Jennings. The good
145. Id. at 1312 n.30.
146. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
147. Id.
148. See Comment, supra note 45, at 889.
149. Id. at 891.
150. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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Samaritan approach provides no guidance for determining where the
initial act of discretion begins and ends, and intermediate level policy
decisions may be the subject of tort liability even when the purposes
for the legislative grant of immunity are present.
E. The Alaska Supreme Court's Tendency to Confuse the
Negligence and Immunity Issues When Applying the
Planning-Operational Distinction
A further weakness in the Alaska Supreme Court's resolution of
state tort liability cases is the court's tendency to confuse the negli-
gence and immunity issues. The court confused these two issues in
Jennings v. State, 151 and the confusion resurfaced in the court's most
recent state immunity decision, Industrial Indemnity Co. v. State. 152
In Industrial Indemnity Co., the court examined the allegedly
negligent act of the state in failing to install a highway guardrail.15 3
Industrial Indemnity submitted evidence which indicated that the
original project proposal called for the installation of a guardrail
where the accident occurred and that various highway officials had
argued in favor of its installation.154 Applying the planning-
operational distinction, the court held that the decision not to place a
guardrail at the accident site was a planning level decision because it
included an assessment of competing priorities and a weighing of
budgetary considerations, including the ultimate priority of funds
available from the state of Alaska and the federal government. 155
Industrial Indemnity argued that although the decision to reduce
funding for the highway in question may have been a planning level
decision, the engineering decisions concerning which guardrails
should be installed and which should be omitted were operational level
decisions.156 In rejecting this argument, the court stated that it did
not know, from the facts presented, which criteria it could use to de-
termine whether the guardrails actually built were the correct ones or
151. 556 P.2d at 1311-12. The court stated: "of controlling significance, in our
view, is the fact that the child was struck. . . at a point some three blocks away from
the [intersection nearest the school at which crossing safety measures had been
taken]." As the dissent in Industrial Indemnity Co. noted, "the fact that the state
provided safe passage across the busy road at the point nearest the school. . . [affects]
whether the state fuilfilled its duty to use reasonable care." Industrial Indemnity Co.
v. State, 669 P.2d at 567 (Matthews, J., dissenting). This fact, however, has no bear-
ing "at all on whether the state's decision not to build a crosswalk where the accident
happened was of a planning, rather than an operational, nature." Id.
152. 669 P.2d 561 (Alaska 1983).
153. Id. at 562.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 564-65 & 564 n.7.
156. Id. at 565-66.
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the wrong ones,157 because the plaintiff made no specific allegations
which would support its claim of operational negligence.158
As the dissent pointed out, the majority seems to have confused
the negligence and immunity issues.1 59 The court seems to have de-
cided that since there was no apparent engineering negligence, the
state was entitled to immunity.16 A court's belief that there was no
negligence, however, should not affect its resolution of the immunity
issue. There are likely to be cases which present a similar immunity
issue, but which present clear criteria from which the court could
draw the conclusion that there was negligence-for example, evidence
that at a particular location there were narrow shoulders, sharp
curves, and heavy traffic usage patterns; evidence of other fatalities at
the location of which the state had notice; and evidence that other
places along the highway with guardrails did not present such unique
hazards.1 61 Instead of focusing on the plaintiff's failure to make spe-
cific allegations that would support its claim of operational negligence,
the court should first have resolved the immunity issue. In resolving
the immunity question, the court should have used the planning-oper-
ational test to determine whether the underlying purposes of the dis-
cretionary function doctrine were present. That is, the court should
have determined whether the factors the state engineers were author-
ized to consider, and those that they actually did consider, were basic
policy factors which courts are institutionally ill-equipped to investi-
gate and balance.
The engineering decisions relating to the placement of guardrails
in Industrial Indemnity Co. do not seem to involve the weighing of
social, economic, or political considerations which accompany basic
policy determinations. Instead, these engineering decisions seem to in-
volve solely an evaluation of routine data, that is, existing safety
hazards, and therefore appear to be operational decisions. The court
should have declared that the discretionary function exception was not
applicable and that the state could be found liable for the alleged negli-
gence of the engineers. The court should have remanded the case to
the trial court to resolve the negligence issue. The result here may
have been the same since the plaintiff seemed to have alleged insuffi-
cient facts to support a determination of negligence. The case as it was
decided, however, is bad precedent because it fails to use the planning-
operational distinction to resolve the immunity issue.
157. Id. at 565 n.10.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 567 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
By enacting the Alaska Tort Claims Act, the Alaska legislature
attempted to provide a more equitable procedure for the adjudication
of tort claims against the state. This objective was to be achieved by
making state liability the rule, but allowing a limited exception to
liability when a state entity or employee acted in its discretionary
capacity.
The Alaska Supreme Court in Abbott v. State' 62 adopted the
planning-operational distinction for determining the scope of the dis-
cretionary function exception, an approach well adapted to the pur-
poses behind the legislature's enactment of the Alaska Tort Claims
Act. In later cases, however, the court has failed to apply this test
correctly. The result is a confused judicial interpretation of the discre-
tionary function exception. In a number of decisions, the court ap-
plied the planning-operational distinction in a semantic manner,
failing to focus on the reasons behind the legislative grant of immunity
to the state. In the court's most recent decision, Industrial Indemnity
Co. v. State, 163 the court stated that it was precluded from adopting a
rule which would require the state to prove that a considered policy
evaluation took place as a precondition for entitlement to sovereign
immunity. This statement is contrary to the language of the discre-
tionary function exception of the Alaska Tort Claims Act and its un-
derlying rationale. Additionally, in other cases, the court has applied
the good Samaritan test instead of applying the planning-operational
distinction,'" and has confused the negligence and immunity issues
while attempting to resolve the discretionary function
determination.165
In order to clarify its confused analysis of the Alaska Tort Claims
Act, the Alaska Supreme Court should reaffirm the position it adopted
in Abbott. The purposes behind the enactment of the discretionary
function exception - preservation of the separation of powers doc-
trine, recognition of the inability of the courts to reexamine legislative
or executive policy decisions, and prevention of enormous and unpre-
dictable liability resulting from judicial reexamination of other
branches's decisions - must guide the court in its application of the
planning-operational distinction. In applying the distinction, the
courts should clearly articulate whether the state is subject to liability
before deciding the negligence issue. The courts applying the plan-
ning-operational distinction should determine whether the state offi-
cial was authorized to consider basic policy factors and then whether
162. 498 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1972).
163. 669 P.2d 561 (Alaska 1983).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 139-50.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 151-61.
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these factors were actually considered. The burden of proof should be
on the state to demonstrate that the authorized basic policy factors
were in fact considered. If the Alaska Supreme Court adopts this
analysis, it would lend greater predictability to the outcome of state
tort liability cases while also providing guidance to Alaska practition-
ers in structuring their state liability claims.
Marcia Swihart Orgill
Bellanne Meltzer Toren

